
US-China truce holds
The US-China trade truce currently runs to January 10, 2027. If Washington and Beijing extend it, tariffs on Chinese goods stay at their reduced levels and Chinese exports of rare earths and other critical minerals keep flowing. For US manufacturers that means cheaper inputs: magnets for motors, components for electronics and autos, processed minerals for batteries and defense hardware. It also keeps the Chinese market open to US exporters of semiconductors, aircraft, agricultural equipment and industrial machinery. A portfolio under this thesis selects US-listed companies with material sales into China or material dependence on Chinese components and minerals: chipmakers and chip-equipment vendors, automakers and auto suppliers, electronics and industrial manufacturers, and consumer brands with large Chinese revenue. Companies that benefit from Chinese supply restrictions, such as domestic rare-earth miners and processors, are excluded.
Amphenol makes connectors, sensors and interconnect systems sold into IT datacom, mobile devices, automotive, industrial, aerospace and defense end markets. its FY2025 10-K reports China at about 16% of net sales ($3.67bn) and about 37% of long-lived assets, with the US and China named as its two largest markets — so China is a top-two reported geography, just over the brief's 15% direct threshold for leg 1. the exposure is two-sided: most China sales are produced locally for Chinese OEMs (market-access and boycott risk rather than tariff risk), while a large China manufacturing base also ships into the US (leg 2 tariff and input-cost channel). the remaining ~84% of sales, increasingly AI data-center interconnect for US hyperscalers, does not move with the truce, and China's share is diluting as AI revenue grows (22% in 2024 → 16% in 2025). material but not the whole business → 0.6.
Qualcomm designs handset, automotive and IoT chips (QCT) and licenses wireless patents (QTL). China is its single largest geography: customers headquartered in China (incl. Hong Kong) were 46% of fiscal 2025 revenue, up from 37% in fiscal 2023, driven by Xiaomi, Honor, Vivo and OnePlus flagship sockets. that puts it well above the 15% direct threshold for leg 1 and makes Greater China the top reported geography, as portfolio 1 requires. the company is a textbook case of the market-access channel: the 2024 Huawei export-licence revocation already removed a top Chinese customer, and Beijing opened a SAMR antitrust probe in October 2025, so a lapse would hit through both US licensing and Chinese retaliation. not a 1.0 because ~54% of revenue sits outside China and the handset cycle, Apple modem roll-off and OEM in-house silicon move earnings independently of the truce. 0.8 — direct, top-geography exposure short of a pure play.
Texas Instruments is the largest analog and embedded-processing chip maker, over 95% of revenue from semiconductors ($17.68bn in 2025). its FY2025 10-K puts revenue from end customers headquartered in China at about 20% (second-largest geography after the US) and products shipped into China at about 50% of revenue, so China is a top-two reported geography and clears the 15% direct threshold for leg 1. the remaining ~80% of customer-HQ revenue sits in the US, Europe, Japan and the rest of Asia, and the 50% shipment figure reflects contract manufacturing in China rather than Chinese demand, so the truce moves a material slice of earnings but not the business as a whole. China revenue is also the specific target of Beijing's september 2025 analog-chip anti-dumping probe, which a truce would need to keep from turning into duties. material exposure → 0.6.
Lam Research sells wafer-fab equipment (etch and deposition) to chipmakers worldwide; China is its single largest reported geography. the fy2026 10-K puts China at approximately 34% of total revenue (34% in fy2025, 42% in fy2024), covering both global customers' China fabs and domestic Chinese chipmakers, and third-party coverage of the latest quarter puts it near 35%. that clears the leg 1 direct threshold (15%+) by a wide margin and makes China a top-two geography, which is the portfolio 1 test. the business as a whole is not the truce — roughly two-thirds of revenue is Korea, Taiwan, the US, Japan and elsewhere, and the AI memory capex cycle is the main earnings driver — so this is well above material exposure but short of pure play: 0.75. the company itself flags that China sales have been and will likely be materially affected by export licence requirements and trade actions.
Axcelis makes ion implantation equipment for semiconductor fabs plus aftermarket parts and service; it is a single-segment US chip-equipment vendor headquartered in Massachusetts. China is its largest geography by a wide margin — 42% of FY2025 revenue and 46% of Q2 2026 revenue, with South Korea second at 26% — so roughly half of sales and a larger share of incremental earnings depend on Chinese mature-node and silicon-carbide power customers continuing to buy US tools. that is the leg 1 market-access mechanism almost exactly: continued Chinese fab spending without retaliatory tariffs, boycotts or revoked licences flows straight to systems revenue and gross margin. China share is more than triple the 15% direct threshold and the truce is plausibly the single largest swing factor in earnings, which supports a near pure-play tier; the residual below 1.0 reflects the non-China half of revenue and the cyclical memory and Korea exposure that moves independently of trade policy.
KLA sells process-control (inspection and metrology) wafer fab equipment plus services to chipmakers; TSMC is the only >10% customer. its fy2026 10-K shows China at $4.05bn, 29.8% of $13.6bn revenue by ship-to location — the largest single region for the year, ahead of Taiwan at 26.8% — and 33% and 43% in fy2025 and fy2024. the latest quarter ran at 26% China behind Taiwan at 31%. that is a leg 1 direct exporter well above the 15% direct threshold and a top-two geography, so it fits this portfolio's angle. it is not a pure play: roughly 70% of revenue is Taiwan, Korea, north america and other regions driven by AI and advanced-node capex that is indifferent to the truce, and China orders are mostly legacy-node domestic fabs whose main swing factor is US commerce export rules rather than the tariff truce itself. material exposure → 0.65.
Tapestry is a US handbag and accessories group — Coach is 86% of revenue and all operating profit, Kate Spade the rest. it fits leg 1 as a consumer brand with a reported Greater China segment: FY2026 (ended June 2026) pro forma Greater China revenue was $1,396.6m of $7,989.6m, about 17.5% of sales, the second-largest region after North America ($5,034.1m), and it grew 35% constant currency for the year against 17% for the group. Reuters independently puts China at about 15% of the business and management says China and Europe are the focus of international expansion expected to supply 70% of growth. that clears the 15% direct threshold and the top-two geography test for this portfolio, but roughly 80% of sales sit outside China and the brand's input tariffs are set mostly by Vietnam, Cambodia and the Philippines rather than the truce, so earnings only partly move with the thesis — material exposure, 0.6.
Applied Materials is the largest wafer fabrication equipment vendor, selling deposition, etch, cmp, metrology and services to foundries, logic and memory fabs worldwide. China is its single largest reported geography — $2.5bn or 28% of q3 fy2026 revenue, ahead of Taiwan at 22% — and sat at 27 to 30% across the prior two quarters. that clears the brief's 15% direct threshold for leg 1 and the portfolio's top-two-geography test, so a holding truce that keeps Chinese fabs buying US tools and avoids new US licence revocations or Chinese retaliation protects roughly a quarter of revenue at semiconductor-systems margins above 50%. the remaining 72% is Taiwan, Korea, US, Japan and Europe demand driven by the AI capex cycle, not the truce, which keeps this at material exposure rather than pure play. tier 0.6.
Intel designs and manufactures x86 CPUs for PCs and data centers (CCG and DCAI segments) and runs its own fabs via Intel Foundry. China is its largest billing geography: the FY2024 10-K puts billings to China at 29% of revenue (about $15.5bn) and an independent filing summary puts FY2025 at 24% (about $12.7bn), well above the 15% direct-exposure bar for leg 1. the link to the truce is unusually direct because Chinese customs treat wafer-fab location as origin, so Intel's US-fabbed chips bear China's retaliatory tariff while TSMC-fabbed rivals (AMD, Nvidia, Qualcomm) are exempt — a lapse would hit Intel's China pricing and share specifically. secondary leg 2 touch via China-sourced rare earths and a China assembly and test site. roughly a quarter of revenue moves with market access, with the remainder (US, Singapore, Taiwan billings, foundry) unrelated → material exposure, 0.65.
Estée Lauder is a US-headquartered prestige beauty manufacturer (skincare, makeup, fragrance, haircare) with fiscal 2026 net sales of $15.0bn. the fy2026 10-k reports Mainland China as a standalone region at $3,058m, about 20% of net sales, up 12% reported; Asia travel retail (Hong Kong, Hainan, Korea) sits in Asia/Pacific and adds further Chinese-consumer demand, so the reference record's roughly one-quarter is a fair greater china figure. products are made in the US, Europe, Canada and Japan and exported into china, so the business is exposed to retaliatory tariffs, licensing frictions and boycotts of US brands — leg 1 as the brief defines it. that clears the 15% direct threshold but Mainland China is the smallest of four reported regions and the China business is driven by prestige-beauty demand and share gains rather than by trade policy, so the truce is a tail-risk hedge, not the single largest swing factor → 0.6 material exposure.
AMD designs CPUs, GPUs and adaptive chips for data center, PC, gaming and embedded markets; FY2025 revenue $34.6bn. the FY2025 10-K reports $7,751m of net revenue billed to China including Hong Kong — 22.4% of total and the second-largest geography after the United States, clearing the 15% direct threshold for leg 1. the China line is directly exposed to the truce mechanism: MI308 accelerator sales into China were halted by the April 2025 licence requirement (c.$800m of charges), resumed under US licences in Q4 2025 (c.$390m), and the Q2 2026 10-Q adds licensed MI325 shipments subject to US inspection and a 25% tariff. roughly a fifth of revenue therefore moves with market access and licence continuity, but the remaining four fifths is driven by AI data center and PC demand, and billing location overstates end demand because Chinese ODMs assemble for global OEMs. material exposure, not a pure play → 0.6.
